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Led  by  Dale  E.  Hathaway
At  this  point  the  participants  were  broken  into  small  groups  and
given  one  of  the  four  alternatives  of  economic  cooperation  to  discuss.
The  following  material  was submitted  to  each  group  to  furnish  extra  in-
formation  and  stimulate  discussion.
V.  THE  ALTERNATIVES  IN  ECONOMIC  COOPERATION
A.  Continued  Long-Term  Economic  Aid  in  the  Form  of  Gifts.  Lend  lease
and  UNRRA  were  emergency  programs  of  relatively  short  duration.  The
ECA  program  superseded  both  and  is  still  in  operation.  Let's  get  bet-
ter  acquainted  with  ECA.
ECA  means  Economic  Cooperation  Administration  but  is  usually refer-
red  to as  the  Marshall  Plan  because  it  grew  out  of  a  proposal  by  Gener-
al George  C.  Marshall,  then  Secretary  of  State.  Its  immediate  goal  was
the  restoration  of  Europe,  but  it  has  developed  into a  dynamic  program
of  global  dimensions  closely  integrated  with  the  total  foreign  policy
of  the  United  States.  Through  ECA,  Europe  hoped  for viability  by  1952.
In  the  first  three  years  it  has  cost  some  12  billion  dollars.  This
represents  a considerable  burden  for  the  United  States  taxpayer  but  in
all  fairness,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  three-fourths  of  the  cost
of  all projects  was  contributed  by  the  European  taxpayer  and  worker.
1.  Benefits to  the  United States.  It  is  impossible  to  measure  the
real  costs  and  benefits  but  a  few  observations  can  be  made  to  clear  up
some  of  the  misconceptions  concerning  them.  Since  dollars  are  good
only  in  this country,  our  real  cost  was  the  goods  and  services  we  ex-
ported  for  which  we  received  no  goods  and  services  in  return.  It  can
well  be  argued  that  the  benefits  to  the  United  States  far  exceeded  the
cost.  We  maintained  old  markets  and  tapped  some  new  ones.  Europeans
give  ECA  much  of  the  credit  for  halting  the  spread  of  communism  in
Western  Europe.  There  is  no  way  of  calculating  the  cost  of  such  an  al-
ternative.
In  spite  of  publicized  criticism  in  Europe  of  the  implementation  of
the  program,  all  of  the  public  opinion  polls  indicate  that  not  only  do
most  Europeans  have  considerable  knowledge  of  the  program  (far  more
than  our  own  people),  but  also  they  greatly  appreciate  the  effort  of
the  United  States  in  their  behalf.  The  surveys  in  Norway,  Denmark,  the
Netherlands,  France,  Austria  and  Germany  revealed  that  about  80  percent
of  the  public  knew  about  the  Marshall  Plan  and  that  only  5-9  percent
were  opposed  to  it  while  most  strongly  endorsed  it.  This  good  will  the
world  over  cannot  be  measured  in  dollars.
2.  Benefits  in  Receiving  Countries.  It  is  difficult  to  discuss  the
benefits  without  knowing  how  ECA  functions.  The  individual  recipient
gets  nothing  free  and  few  recipients  realize  that  although  they  paid
out  cash,  the  merchandise  was  a  gift  to  their  country.  An  example  will
best  explain  how  this  is  so.
M. Jolivet  of  France  needed  a  tractor.  He  had  the  necessary
19500,000  francs but in  the postwar economy they were no  good in  the United
States  --  the only place  tractors were available.  But when  the French
farm  organization decided he was eligible  under the allocation program,
he paid his money to the  French  government and  the ECA paid  the American
manufacturer  in  dollars.  M. Jolivet got his  tractor.
What happens  to  the 500,000  francs?  They are  set aside by  the  foreign
government as "counterpart funds."  Five percent  of these  funds  is  allocat-
ed  to ECA  to pay administrative costs in  that country, and  to secure
scarce materials  for stock-piling in  the United States.  The remaining 95
percent must  be used for financial stabilization,  for stimulating produc-
tive activity,  or developing new sources of  wealth.  The  ECA does not
dictate use of  counterpart  funds but must give  approval.
Thus, the  receiving country has  from this country  the equivalent of
the gift in  their own money for.rehabilitation  purposes.  It  has  been
estimated that  an average expenditure of between  four and  five billion
dollars a year of ECA money has enabled Europe  to increase  production by
approximately 30  billion dollars per year.  Certainly not all of European
recovery can  be  attributed to  ECA;  on  the other hand, many of the  bene-
fits,  such  as  the  improvement in  health and morale,  cannot be  demonstrat-
ed with statistics.
With ECA aid, Western Europe has accomplished more  in  the four years
following World War II  than  it  accomplished  in  seven years after World
War I.  The average increase  in  agricultural production  for all  partici-
pating countries  (prewar = 100) was  from 85  in  1947-48 to 109 in 1950-51.
Industrial production  (1938 = 100) was  101  in  1948  and  127  in  1950,  and
was running  over 140 by  1951  --  in  Western Germany it  about doubled  in  the
three years and  by the  end  of  1950 was above 1938.  Export  volume has
risen more than 50 percent above prewar.  The success of  the European
Payments Union, progress  in  the Schuman Plan,  and other evidences of
cooperation are  all  indications of better relationships in  Europe.
Much remains  to be done.  Inflation has been checked but is  still a
great  problem.  A massive increase  in  output in  the  next few years must
be achieved  if  adequate defense against communist aggression is  to be
attained and at  the  same  time a  satisfactory level of living is  to be
made  available for  the people.
B.  A  Technical  Assistance Program.  One of the  alternatives of economic
cooperation  is  the  Point IV  proposal,  so  called because  it  is  the  fourth
point of  President Truman's inaugural  address, the  essence of which is
briefed as  follows:  "Fourth,  we  must embark  on a bold new program for
making the benefits of our scientific advances  and industrial  progress
available  for the  improvement and growth  of underdeveloped areas."
-----  we should make available  to peace-loving peoples the  benefits
of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their
aspirations  for a better life.  And, in  cooperation  with other nations
we should foster capital investment  in  areas needing development."
In  August  1950 Congress passed  the Act for  International Development
which contains this  section:  "The peoples  of the United States  and other
nations  have a  common  interest  in  the freedom and  in  the economic and
social progress of all peoples.  Such  progress can further the secure
20growth of democratic ways of life,  the expansion of mutually beneficial
commerce,  the development of  international understanding and good will,
and  the  maintenance  of world peace."
The Act provided that  the President should appoint a board of  citi-
zens to be called  the  International Development Advisory Board'-- known
as  the Rockefeller Board  because Nelson Rockefeller is  its  chairman.
The Board  in  its report  to the President proposed specific plans for
world economic development, and in  view of  the national emergency
stressed the  urgency of these plans for our own defense.  In  carrying
them out, it  recommended cooperation with other governments, the United
Nations, voluntary agencies and private citizens.
Some of  the recommendations were as  follows:
1.  Unification  of major foreign economic activities of  the United
States  into one over-all agency, an Overseas Economic Administra-
tion.  There  are now  23  agencies with some foreign economic
operations.
2.  In  order to stimulate  the participation of private enterprise  the
program should  include:
(a) A tax incentive by which  income would  be taxed  only in  the
country where it  is  earned;
(b) Bilateral  tax and commercial  treaties;
(c) Underwriting by the Export-Import Bank of the transfer risk
on  foreign dollar obligations;
(d) Creation of an  International Finance  Corporation as an af-
filiate  of the  International Bank  to serve private  enter-
prise abroad.
The minimum of  investment should be  2  billion dollars per year
--  about three  times the  postwar  flow.
3.  The  first major objective would be  to cooperate with  the under-
developed  countries  in  a vigorous  food  production drive which
would break  the back  of  famine  and  hunger by increasing  their
production  by at  least 25  percent.
4.  The second major objective should  be  an  increase of about 50
percent in  the production of materials essential to defense.
5.  The United States Government, in  the  present emergency should
appropriate $500,000,000 to  the new Overseas Economic Adminis-
tration  for joint basic services, emergency  public  works,  and
basic  program services such as  health and sanitation, education
and  vocational  training,  agriculture  and  public  administration.
6.  Create  a  new  International  Development  Authority  of all  free
nations  to  be  financed by many nations  for promotion of public
works  essential  to  development but not primarily defense  projects.
7.  All development programs  in  which the United  States takes  part
should be on a  cooperative  basis with  local  participation -
financial  and  administrative.
Point  IV  is  not  intended  to  be  a  "give-away"  program.  It  does  not
mean  shiploads  of  tractors  and  combines  to  areas  where  manpower  is  still
21the cheapest commodity available.  Technical assistance --  "know-how"
--  will  be emphasized.  Just a  steel  point on the stick  that is  used for
a plow, some  improved seeds,  fertilizer,  and insecticides  could work
wonders.  This was demonstrated by an  American county  extension agent on
an area of  100 square miles  in India.  Just a few  of these simple
practices  increased the yield 66  percent in  the second  crop year under  less
favorable  growing conditions.
Only part of the answer lies  in  agricultural  improvement.  Industrial-
ization, with its secondary and tertiary benefits, would help absorb the
unemployed  or underemployed and raise  the level of  living.
No grants would be made  to cover the full cost.  Active  interest and
participation would have  to be displayed  by local people.  In  order to
have continuity, the  program should  try to work with peoples  as  well as
governments.  Governments are unstable.  We have often been on  the
"wrong" side of a revolution.  By working with  independent institutions,
groups,  and individuals, this  might be avoided.
The Advisory Board concludes  their report to the President  by a
statement on "Why the Job Must  Be Done":
"The problem of building a society where  lasting peace is  possible  is
not  one of preserving an existing order of the  world but of building a
new structure  in  which all  nations and all mankind can work together,
exchanging their skills,  labor and capital to  their mutual  benefit.  The
essential task  of statesmanship in  the  whole underdeveloped  area might
be  described as  one of finding the means  for  getting on with the future."
"----No  miracles can be  promised, none should  be expected.  Still,
in  reality the  job before  us  is  not as  hard as  it  might seem.  One must
remember that  the economic output  of the  Western nations, measured by
national  income,  is  five times  that  of all the  underdeveloped  areas
taken  together.  The whole  current economic pattern in  these regions
could  be transformed  through a  consistent investment flow from  the Wes-
tern industrialized world of  less  than one percent of  the national in-
come  of the United States and  the nations of Western Europe."
C.  Freer World  Trade Without  Economic Aid.  The position of the United
States in  world  trade changed during World War I.  Before  that  time we
were a debtor nation.  This  meant we exported more  than we  imported,
with the difference going to pay  the interest and principal  of  foreign
loans  to us.  After the war our position was changed.  Other countries  in
the world, especially in  Europe,  owed  us money and we became  a  creditor
nation.  The only method  that those countries  had to pay their debts was
to sell goods to  get dollars  to pay the interest  and principal of their
debts  to  us.  But--we refused  to take their goods  and erected high
tariffs to keep them out.  The countries could not make  their payments
and defaulted.
World  War II  made  the United States an even heavier creditor as we
financed a large  portion of  the war  and the  postwar  reconstruction.  Now
we are  faced with  the  problem of promoting economic progress  in  the
world  without too severe a drain on  our vitality.  One method  of promot-
ing economic  progress that  has been suggested is  encouraging the growth
of international trade.
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comparative  advantage  will  do  more  than  any  other  program  to  restore
a  healthy  world  economy  and  to  encourage  the  economic  progress  needed
throughout  most  of  the  world.  They  say  that  to  build  a  world  economy
on  any  other  basis  is  false  and  misleading.  Some  persons  say  that
much  of  our  direct  aid  merely  continues  maladjustments  that  must  be
corrected.  Let  us  examine  what  a  policy  of  international  trade  would
mean  to  us  and  to  the  rest  of  the  world.
1.  U.  S.  Domestic Policy in  International Trade
a.  PRICE  POLICY.  In  several  areas,  notably  agricultural  products,  the
United  States  has  attempted  to  maintain  domestic  prices  higher  than
world  prices.  In  some  cases  we  have  been  forced  to restrict  the  entry
of  foreign  products  to  prevent  them  from  benefiting  from  our  domestic
support  prices  at  a  high  cost  to  our  government.
If  the  United  States  intends  to  aid  world  development  through  bet-
ter  trade,  we  must  be  prepared  to  compete  in  the  world  market.  It
does  not  make  sense  to  ask  other  countries  to  put  their  faith  in  the
world  market  when  we  refuse  to  do  so.  By  refusing  either  to  sell  our
goods  at  world  prices  or  to  buy  goods  of  other  countries,  we  are  say-
ing  essentially  that  we  do  not  want  world  trade  unless  it  benefits  us
more  than  the  other  countries.
b.  TARIFF  POLICIES.  Our  tariff  policies  are  closely  allied  to
domestic  price  policies.  We  have  used  tariffs  to  prevent  imports  and
to  bolster  domestic  prices  in  many  industries.  If  we  ask  other  coun-
tries  to  make  internal  adjustments  to  strengthen  their  economy,  then  we
must  be  prepared  to  do  the  same.  It  will  do  the  rest  of  the  world
little  good  to  try  to  increase  international  trade  if  we  as  the  world's
major  dollar  market  refuse  to  take  their  goods.  Thus,  we  must  realize
that  high  protective  tariffs  are  inconsistent  with  a  policy  to  encourage
other  nations  to  expand  trade.
c.  INTERNAL  STABILITY.  One  of  the  most  important  conditions
needed  to  make  sound  international  trade  feasible  is  internal  domestic
price  and  employment  stability  in  the  United  States.  Since  our  economy
dominates  the  world,  its stability  is  vital.  If  we  have  a  rapid  in-
flation,  it  means  that  our  exports  may  cost  other  countries  much  more
without  a  corresponding  rise  in  their  export  prices.  If  we  have  a  re-
cession  or  depression,  it  has  world-wide  effects  as  our  demand  for  im-
ports  declines.  Thus,  if  we  suggest  that  other  countries  throw  them-
selves  on  the  mercy  of  free  trade,  we  must  do  all  in  our  power  to
stabilize  our  economy.
2.  Domestic Policies of  Other Nations
a.  IMPORT  RESTRICTIONS.  If  a  policy  of  free  trade  is  to  be  followed
by  the  world,  many  countries  will  be  required  to  make  severe  internal
adjustments.  Many  countries  now  have  import  restrictions  on  goods
from  dollar  areas  to  protect  their  dollar  reserves.  If  these  restric-
tions  were  removed  and  trade  initiated  without  direct  aid  in dollars,
these  same  areas  would  be  forced  to  take  large  cuts  in  living  standards.
There  is  some  question  as  t6  the  wisdom  of  such  a  policy  in  areas  where
living  standards  are  already  low  and  we  are  competing  with  communism  for
the  people's  support.  The  productive  capacity  of  the  countries
23may need  to be improved  before  their restrictions  to  international
trade are removed.
b. NATIONALIST  SELF-SUFFICIENCY.  Some countries  have  deliberately  re-
fused  to participate in international trade  because they do not want to
become tied to any other country's foreign policy.  They feel  that by
avoiding dependence on world markets, they can remain neutral  in  the world
power  struggle.  They  are  willing  to  have  somewhat  lower  standards  of  liv-
ing  on  a  self-sufficient  basis  rather  than  risk  being  drawn  into  a  world
war.
If  we  want  a  free  international  trade,  we  will  have  to  persuade  such
countries  that  they will  not  lose  by  participating.  This  may  require
assurances  on our part that we  will provide  effective  help  for them  in
event  of  war.  They  will  undoubtedly  also  want  some  assurances  that  they
will  get  a  fair  share of the world's  raw materials  in  times  of  world  pres-
sures.  Without such guarantees some  nations may prefer to remain
nationalistic  and self-sufficient.  If  many nations choose such a policy,
there is  little chance  that a strong international trade  program will
contribute  to  economic  progress  in  the  world.
3.  Investment  and International Trade
Along with benefits  from international trade,  the world needs large
.increases  in  productivity.  The  productivity  increase  is  dependent  on
capital  investment.  Thus,  the  world  faces  the  problem  of  attracting
large  capital  investments  to underdeveloped  areas.
The  problem  of  investment  is  no  simple  one  in  these  areas.  In  most
of  these  areas  the  population  is  at  the  subsistence level.  This means
there  is  little  or no  saving to  generate  private capital in  those coun-
tries.  In  this case the  investment must come from the  foreign govern-
ment,  our  government,  or  our  private  investors.  Most  economists  think
that  other  nations  would  get  the  most  rapid  growth  and  greatest  benefits
if  they  could  attract  outside  private  investors.  The  United  States  is
the  only nation  in  the  world  where  sufficient  investment  capital  to
aid  world  development  materially  is  available,  but  our  investors  have
always been  extremely  reluctant to make foreign investments.  On one
side  there  have  been  the  attractive  and  relatively  safe  investment  op-
portunities  at  home.  Other  countries  with  large  investments abroad  have
always  stood  ready  to  use  their  foreign  policy  to  protect or further their
investments.  Our  foreign  policy  has  never  been  disposed  to  protect
foreign  investments.
If  we  wish  to  strengthen  the  world  through  a  policy of free  trade, we
must  be  willing  and  able  to  furnish  the  investment  capital  to  help  other
countries become productive.  If  we  furnish capital we  may be called
economic  imperialists  and provide ammunition  for communist propaganda.
If  we do nothing,  the  underdeveloped nations may feel forced  to turn to
state  socialism  to  get  the  necessary  capital  to  develop.
A further  factor  that  prevents  outside  investment  in  many  under-
developed  countries is lack of political  stability.  There have been many
cases of capital expropriation  of  foreign investments.  Iran is  the most
recent  example.  Unless  some kind of protection can  be provided  to cover
the  risk,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  necessary  private  investment  capital
can be  attracted  from the United  States.
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problem of sunk investment.  Economic theory  assumes  that each country
has  internal mobility  and  can  quickly adapt to  changes  in  the competitive
position  in  world trade.  This  is  not as simple  as  it  sounds.
Once a relatively  poor country has made  some  investment, it  cannot
easily  abandon  it.  The  Japanese silk  industry is  a  case  in  point.  Much
of  the  world market  for silk cloth has been  destroyed by nylon  and other
substitutes.  However, the  Japanese have major  investments in  silk mills
and lack the necessary capital to develop new industries  to replace  them.
Thus the problem of sunk  investment is  a  major  factor creating friction
in  the  adjustment  of  international  trade.
D.  A Combination  Program.  Many  persons  say  that  no  single  program  will
be  enough  to  bring  the  desired  world  development  soon  enough.  They  suggest
a  combination  of  the  programs,  tailored  to fit  each  area,  as  the  best
solution  to  the  world  development  problems.
1.  Direct Aid.  Since  capital  for  economic  development  is  the  most  ur-
gent  requirement  of  some  areas,  it  has  been  suggested  that  it  might  be  to
our  national  interest  to  furnish  some  of  it  in  the  form  of  direct  aid.
For  those  areas  where  there  was  war  devastation,  we  have  already  made
direct  loans  and  gifts.  Further  aid  of  this  type  may  be  necessary  to
forestall  communism.  In  some  areas  the  people  have  awakened  to  the  pos-
sibilities  of  a  better  life.  They  are  not  going  to  be  content  to wait
100  years  to  get  economic  progress.  Any  aid  we  give  these  people  may
save  many  times  its  cost  in  future  wars.
It  is  likely  that  neither  technical  assistance  nor  free  trade  will
help  some  parts  of  the  world  unless  they  are  supplemented  by  some  direct
aid.  Economic  development  is  a  complex  process  requiring  all  the  tools
at  our disposal.
2.  Technical Assistance.  No  program  of  aid  to  underdeveloped  countries
will  be  successful  if  it  is  not  firmly  based  on  methods  to  increase
productivity.  Our  technical  knowledge  cannot  be  given  as  a  package  ex-
port;  it  must  be  taught.  Our  direct  aid  would  have  been  largely  wasted
if  it  had  not  resulted  in  increased  productivity.
3.  Trade.  Neither  direct  aid nor  technical  assistance  will  be  of  much
avail  if  we  do  not  encourage  and  participate  in  expansion  of  internation-
al  trade.  We  will  be  foolish  if  we  refuse  to  take  the  goods  other  coun-
tries  produce  in  payment  for  our  loans,  and  we  must  be  prepared  to  buy
some  of  the  products  that result  from  our  technical  assistance  programs.
Thus,  a  wise  trade  policy  is  a  necessary  part  of  any  program  that  we
participate  in  to  better  world  economic  conditions.
Since  the  needs  and  conditions  of  each  country  in  the  world  vary,  a
program  which  combines  aspects  of all  forms  of  economic  policies  may  best
support  our  foreign  policy.  By  tailoring  each  program,  we  can  help  each
country  help  itself without  becoming  economic  imperialists  or  supporting
a  permanent  give-away  program.  The  policy  toward  each  country  can  be  var-
ied  to fit political  conditions,  and  the  maximum  effort  toward  world
progress  and  world  peace  will  be  achieved.
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